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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-4145 
___________ 
 
RICHARD POTTS, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DAVID J. EBBERT 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3:12-cv-01355) 
District Judge:  Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to  
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 2, 2013 
Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  June 4, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Richard Potts appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing his petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus.  Because the appeal presents no substantial question, we will 
summarily affirm the District Court’s order. 
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I. 
 In 2003, a jury in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania convicted Richard Potts of murder and conspiracy to distribute cocaine 
base within 1,000 feet of a school.  Following an appeal and remand for resentencing, the 
Eastern District sentenced Potts to two concurrent life sentences. 
 Since this court affirmed his sentence in 2007, Potts has filed a number of 
collateral attacks on his sentence.  In 2009, he filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.  The 
District Court denied his motion, we denied Potts’ application for a certificate of 
appealability (“COA”), see United States v. Potts, C.A. No. 10-1682 (order entered July 
22, 2010), and the Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari.  Potts then 
filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).  As before, the District 
Court denied his motion, we declined to issue a COA, see United States v. Potts, C.A. 
No. 11-1820 (order entered June 30, 2011), and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.  
Potts next filed a request for authorization to file a second or successive section 2255 
motion, which we also denied.  See In re: Richard Potts, C.A. No. 11-3903 (order entered 
Dec. 13, 2011). 
 Most recently, Potts filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2241.  The Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing the petition for lack of 
jurisdiction because Potts did not demonstrate that filing a section 2255 motion would be 
inadequate or ineffective.  Overruling Potts’ objections, the District Court adopted the 
Magistrate Judge’s recommendation and dismissed the petition.  Potts timely appeals. 
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II. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).
1
  We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions.  Vega v. United States, 493 
F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007).  We may summarily affirm a judgment of the District Court 
if the appeal does not raise a substantial question.  See I.O.P. 10.6; see also Murray v. 
Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011). 
III. 
The District Court properly dismissed Potts’ section 2241 petition for lack of 
jurisdiction.  A motion filed under section 2255 in the sentencing court is the presumptive 
means for a federal prisoner to challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence.  
Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002).  However, a petitioner can 
seek relief under section 2241 if the remedy provided by section 2255 is inadequate or 
ineffective to test the legality of his detention.  28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); In re Dorsainvil, 119 
F.3d 245, 249-51 (3d Cir. 1997).  “Section 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective merely 
because the sentencing court does not grant relief, the one-year statute of limitations has 
expired, or the petitioner is unable to meet the stringent gatekeeping requirements of the 
amended § 2255.”  Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 539 (3d Cir. 
2002) (per curiam).  Rather, the “safety valve” provided under section 2255 is extremely 
narrow and applies only in unusual situations, such as those in which a prisoner has had 
                                              
1
 A certificate of appealability is not required to appeal the denial of a section 2241 
petition.  Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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no prior opportunity to challenge his conviction for actions later deemed to be non-
criminal by an intervening change in law.  See Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120 (citing In re 
Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251). 
We agree with the District Court that section 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective 
to test the legality of Potts’ detention.  Potts sought to invoke the “safety valve” by way 
of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in DePierre v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2225 
(2011).  In DePierre, the Supreme Court held that the term “cocaine base” as used in 21 
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) includes both crack cocaine and cocaine in its chemically basic 
form.  131 S. Ct. at 2237.  Importantly, DePierre is consistent with precedent in this 
Circuit that existed at the time of Potts’ sentencing, direct appeal, and section 2255 
motion.  See United States v. Barbosa, 271 F.3d 438, 467 (3d Cir. 2001).  Because Potts 
does not rely on an intervening change in the law, his case is not one that falls within the 
ambit of Dorsainvil.
2
  Moreover, the mere fact that Potts already raised his DePierre 
argument in an unsuccessful application to file a second or successive section 2255 
motion does not make section 2255 an inadequate or ineffective remedy.  See Cradle, 290 
F.3d at 539.  For these reasons, Potts has not shown that section 2255 is “inadequate or 
ineffective” to test the legality of his detention.  See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251. 
                                              
2
 In any case, as the District Court noted, DePierre does not exclude crack cocaine from 
the sentencing scheme under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), see DePierre, 131 S. Ct. at 
2237, and therefore does not undermine the portion of Potts’ sentence that relates to 
conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine. 
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Accordingly, the District Court did not err in dismissing Potts’ section 2241 
petition for lack of jurisdiction.  For substantially the same reasons set forth by the 
District Court, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order dismissing Potts’ 
section 2241 petition.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 
